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Abstract: 
Asian emerging market countries have followed growth convergence from a low-
income, high-growth state to a middle-income, middle-growth state through industrialization. 
The economic development of Japan was first followed by the “four tigers” in the 1970s, by the 
ASEAN countries in the 1980s, and China in the 1990s to 2000s. Asian economies were 
severely affected by the Asian Currency Crisis of 1997-98, and again by the Global Financial 
Crisis of 2008-09, but much more so by the former.  
The growth rates of Asian countries are slowing over time. The growth rate may fall 
to the advanced countries level, before the income level fully catches up to the advanced 
countries’ level, which is defined as the middle income trap in the paper.  
 This paper proposes a hypothesis that there exist three convergence paths in Asia: 
low-income, middle-income, and high-income. Countries need to shift from one convergence 
path to a higher one by implementing economic and political reforms that would generate 
innovations. Without reform, countries may fall into a low-income trap or a middle-income 
trap.  
 The findings in the paper have important implications for the literature about 
middle-income traps. Providing an interpretation of the middle-income trap in the growth 
convergence framework is novel. Empirical investigations using panel data are also new. Some 
Asian countries are successfully transforming to a high-income convergence path, but others 
have failed thus far to make that transition. However, these results are more in the form of 
suggestive evidence than a hypothesis testing due to the limited sample size. 
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It is well-known that in the past several decades, East Asian countries have achieved high 
economic growth compared to countries in other regions. One Asian country after another 
have followed similar growth paths, or growth convergences, from low-income, high-growth 
states to middle income, middle-growth states, through industrialization. Several of them, 
Japan and Singapore, have reached an advanced economy status. The economic development 
of Japan was first followed by the “four tigers” (South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong and 
Taiwan) in the 1970s, and later by the ASEAN countries in the 1980s and China in the 1990s 
to 2000s.  
The history of economic development in the Asian region has experienced several stages. 
In the 1950s, Japan was already experiencing high-speed growth of 10 percent annually. 
However, this growth was viewed as the case of a pre-war industrial powerhouse catching up 
to its previous level before the devastation from World War II, and an exception within Asia. 
The rest of Asia’s governments were still struggling to establish effective governments after 
independence from European colonial powers.3 Most Asian countries were characterized by 
populous cities in poverty and stagnant agrarian rural areas. At the time, the most influential 
writing on the subject was Gunnar Myrdal’s Asian Drama (1968), which painted a rather 
pessimistic view of the prospects for economic development, arguing such development would 
be difficult considering their large populations, among other factors.  
In the 1960s and 1970s, the four tigers—South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, and 
Taiwan—started to accelerated growth. Both South Korea and Singapore had strong 
governments that pursued industrial policy, employing government planning that encouraged 
particular industries with zoning, subsidies, and the allocation of credits. They increased 
production and exports in goods that Japan had yielded in order to move to higher value-added 
goods for exports. The success of the four tigers prompted policy changes in the Southeast 
economies. Growth rates in Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia started to rise in the mid-1980s. 
As Asian growth spread to the ASEAN countries, the high growth in Asia as a region attracted 
attention. A World Bank study, World Bank (1993) painted a positive picture of East Asian 
experiences of industrialization, export-oriented policies and equitable growth. The study, 
“The East Asian Miracle,” replaced Myrdal’s “Asian Drama” as a representative view of Asia 
with an opposite conclusion.  
The positive view of East Asia suffered a brief setback in the wake of the Asian Financial 
Crisis (AFC) of 1997-98. The currency crises in East Asia—in particular, Thailand, Indonesia, 
and Korea that required IMF assistance—were blamed on crony capitalism and too much risk 
taken by the banking sector, among other factors. The manufacturing success was replaced by 
                                                   
3 Thailand was never colonized. The Philippines had been colonized by the United States 
since 1898. Other Asian states had been ruled by European countries.  
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finance failure. However, most Asian countries had a V-shaped recovery, and they learned 
lessons from the experience. The banking sector was reformed, and foreign reserves were 
accumulated as a buffer for volatile capital flows. During the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 
2008-09, no Asian banks failed due to the problem of asset-backed securities and related 
financial products. The damage to East Asian growth during the GFC was much shallower 
than that of the AFC.  
However, at present, growth rates in Asian countries are slowing down to advanced 
country levels. One fear is that these economies will never catch up with the advanced 
countries, but will rather be trapped in middle-income status. Several factors contribute to 
this pessimism. Japan has experienced two decades of stagnation. China has excelled on all 
industry fronts, leap-frogging forward and leaving some of the neighboring countries behind. 
Constraints in elements of growth, such as infrastructure and human capital development, 
have not been solved in some countries. 
In order to explain the long-run growth experiences of the Asian countries in a more 
generalized framework, growth convergence regressions are applied. Growth theory predicts 
that a low-income state tends to record high growth, and that the growth rate gradually 
becomes lower as the income level becomes higher. The inverse relationship between the 
income level and the growth rate is often depicted as a downward-sloping convergence line. 
This relationship is basically derived from the diminishing returns to capital. The convergence 
path has been often observed in a time-series of one country, but it has been difficult to be 
found in cross-section data, or in panel data. Within a group of countries, such as OECD 
countries, a common convergence path can be found. However, an attempt to find a global 
cross-sectional or panel relationship of convergence often fails. This is understandable, since 
the globally unique convergence path assumes that countries’ production functions, including 
the technological level and progress, are identical and the only difference is the initial level of 
capital (per capita). The unconditional convergence is refuted easily. The literature moves into 
the direction of conditional convergence that allows for differences in culture, geography, 
colonial heritage and other socio-economic terms as initial conditions. There can be different 
convergence lines for different groups of countries. 
Within the failed attempt to find unconditional convergence, the East Asian countries 
always showed positive forecast errors, which means the high-growth rate of East Asia – 
relative to South Asian, African and Latin American countries – recorded higher growth rates, 
given the same income level. Hence, the levels of income among Asian developing countries 
moved toward advanced country levels much faster than countries in other regions. Although 
the Asian Miracle (World Bank, 1993) can be attributed to many factors, it remained untested 
whether experiences in East Asia are unique or applicable to other regions.  
This paper focuses on growth convergence in East Asia. It looks at the panel data of major 
economies in the region. The first test is whether they share a common convergence path. A 
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common, unconditional convergence seems to be denied. Then the paper proceeds to find three 
distinct convergence paths in East Asia. Given the findings, I propose a hypothesis that three 
convergence paths exist in Asia: one converges to a low-income steady state; another to a 
middle-income steady state; and yet another to a high-income steady state. A country can shift 
from one convergence line to a higher one by implementing economic reforms, such as the 
Chinese reform and opening-up that started in 1978 and the Vietnamese Doi Moi which 
started in 1986. Without reforms, a country may end up in the poverty trap, the steady state 
of a low-income convergence path; or in the middle-income trap, the steady state of a middle-
income convergence path. Data seem to suggest that China is moving from a middle-income 
convergence path to a high-income path, and the Philippines is moving from a low-income 
path to a middle-income path. Thailand seems to be heading toward a middle-income trap. 
According to the hypothesis of three convergence lines, the current fear of being trapped 
in middle-income status can be understood as a policy failure that prevents a leap from one 
convergence line to a higher one. The leap requires economic reforms to stimulate innovation. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the growth performances 
of the Asian economies from 1985 to 2015. The Asian countries suffered more in the AFC of 
1997-98 than in the GFC of 2008-09. Section 3 establishes a long-run slowdown of the growth 
rate in almost all countries in Asia. However, slowdowns may be perfectly natural if a growth 
convergence is taking place. Crucial questions are whether the convergence path is common 
for all the Asian countries, and if not, how many of them exist.  
Section 4 establishes three convergence paths—low-income, middle-income and high-
income—in Asia, which is a new finding. Countries can and do jump from one convergence 
path to another by taking up reforms and stimulating innovation. When a country fails to 
jump from a middle-income convergence path to a high-income convergence path, a country is 
said to be caught in a middle-income trap. The country closest to a middle-income trap is 
Thailand. China is making a jump from a middle-income path to a high-income path; and the 
Philippines is making a jump from a low-income path to a middle-income path.  
 
2. Experiences of the crises’ impacts 
The GFC of 2008-09 had significant impacts on many economies, most severely in the Unites 
States and Europe. Asian countries did suffer from the negative spillover from the western 
advanced countries, but the negative impact on growth was much less than other regions. This 
shows a resilience of Asian regions. For emerging and developing Asia, the dip in growth rates 
during the GFC was much shallower than that during the AFC. The severe impact on Asia in 
1997-98 was due to the fact that some of the economies in the region were the origin (epicenter) 
of AFC. Figure 1 is the time series (1985-2015) of the (real GDP) growth rates of various 
regions, using the definition of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), showing that Asia 
consistently grew faster than other regions and its decline in growth was the most serious 
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during the 1997-98 AFC.  
Figure 1 about here 
Figure 2 shows the time series of the growth rates of Japan and the original Four Tigers—
South Korea (Korea), Singapore, Hong Kong SAR (Hong Kong), and Taipei, China (Taiwan)4—
to show growth trends and fluctuations in the last three decades. The figure shows that the 
Four Tigers had a larger dip during the AFC than the GFC, but Japan had the opposite pattern. 
The Figure also shows that the medium-term trend growth of the Four Tigers has been 
declining from 1985-1996 (pre-AFC) to 1999-2007 (inter-crises), to post-GFC. 
Figure 2 about here 
Since China seems to dominate in the economic statistics of the emerging and developing 
Asian countries, a careful decomposition within the region is important. Figure 3 shows the 
growth rate of the same time period for the original ASEAN Five5—Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand—to show a group of emerging Asia. (Singapore appear 
both in Figure 1 and Figure 2.) A long-run growth slowdown from the 1980s to 2010s is evident 
here, particularly under-5% growth in the 2010s, which prompted concerns that Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Thailand may fall into a middle-income trap. The Philippines used to be at the 
bottom of the growth ranking among the ASEAN Five. However, it is now the highest 
performing country among the ASEAN Five during the first half of the 2010s. Something must 
have clicked in the Philippines in the post-GFC period while other ASEAN countries, as well 
as advanced countries, experienced growth slowdowns. Furthermore, until very recently, the 
growth rate of Singapore, despite its high per-capita income, has been comparable to Indonesia, 
Thailand and Malaysia. That implies the income gap between Singapore and the other three 
countries in the region has not narrowed. It suggests that Singapore and the three countries 
are not on the same convergence path.  
Figure 3 about here 
Figure 4 shows the growth pattern of China and India in the same time period, and the 
growth scale as before. China introduced major reforms in 1978 that made the economy much 
more market-oriented and open to the rest of the world. Reformer Deng Xiaoping mapped out 
and implemented a strategy toward reforms that included the privatization of state-owned 
companies. The growth rate subsequently rose in the 1980s. Then Chinese economic growth 
had a big drop in 1989 and 1990. The drop coincided with a decline in foreign direct investment 
into China, most likely a backlash from the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989. A series of 
                                                   
4 The economy of the Island of “Taiwan” is known as “Taiwan Province of China” in IMF, 
“Taipei, China” in ADB, and “Chinese Taipei” in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) and the Olympic games. In this paper, these names are used interchangeably 
without any connotation or implication.  
5 The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established in August 1967 by 
these five countries, and the five countries are often referred to the ASEAN Five, or the 
ASEAN original five.  
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reforms continued even after the Tiananmen Square incident and Deng’s retirement in 1992. 
The Shanghai Stock Exchange was reopened in 1990 after a 41-year closure. The multiple 
foreign exchange rates were unified in 1994. For two decades from 1991 through 2011, China 
maintained a very high growth rate averaging above 10 percent. Only very recently has the 
Chinese growth rate seemed to slow down, which is typical of any country that has achieved 
over 10 percent growth for twenty years.6  
Indian economic growth in the last thirty years has been consistently lower than that of 
China. The income gap between China and India has been widening. There seems to be no 
convergence, but rather divergence between the two countries. However, the growth rate in 
India since 1992 has been higher than before and seems to be accelerating over time. The 
balance-of-payment crisis of 1991 prompted widespread reforms, moving away from Socialism. 
Although these reforms started in 1991, implementation and reaping benefits took a long time. 
India may still be in the slow process of privatization, removing regulatory barriers.  
 
3. Slowdown of growth 
After the GFC, many advanced countries have struggled to stimulate growth even with 
super-relaxed monetary policies and fiscal stimulus. Some economists argued for the case of 
secular stagnation and/or slowed innovations. Others regarded the slowdown more normally, 
considering the GFC was a crisis that originated among advanced countries. It has been 
commonly observed that an economy where a crisis originates suffers from dysfunctional 
financial markets that bring down real activities. The post-financial crisis slowdown in growth 
is commonplace. 
Emerging market economies also suffered a growth slowdown. The Chinese growth rate 
fell from 10% in 2010 to below 7% in 2015. This produced commodity price declines that 
affected resource-producing economies. Other Asian countries also experienced growth 
slowdowns.  
Table 1 summarizes the average growth rates for the three periods: pre-AFC (1985-96); 
inter-crises (1999-2007); and post-GFC (2010-2015). It is evident that, in the Asian emerging 
market economies, the post-GFC growth is less than the period before the GFC. The average 
growth rates between the two crises – the inter-crises period – is even lower than the pre-AFC 
period. Typically the period-average growth rate, g (period), of Asian EM countries have 
experienced:  
g(1985-1996) > g(1999-2007) > g( (2010-2015) 
 
Table 1 about here 
                                                   
6 A typical such example is Japan that had 10 percent growth in the 1950s and 1960s, but 




Two notable exceptions to this stylized fact are the Philippines and the Lao Republic. These 
countries experienced rising growth rates from pre-ACC to post-ACC and from pre-GFC to 
post-GFC. Improving macroeconomic policy management in the Philippines is finally bearing 
fruit. For Lao, increasing exports of water power electricity to Thailand is helping its economic 
growth. 
Many policy makers and scholars view this stylized fact as post-crisis slowdown and 
stagnation among EM countries. After the AFC, we often heard frustration among policy 
makers from Bangkok to Jakarta to Kuala Lumpur, in that the growth rate did not recover to 
the pre-GFC level.  
More recently, some policy makers in ASEAN-5 talk about “middle income traps.” Although 
incomes are still at the upper-middle level, potential growth rates seem to have declined 
significantly. The Chinese industrial potential is fast catching up to the ASEAN-5 levels, while 
innovation among ASEAN countries seems to have failed to catch up with that of Japan, 
Singapore, and Korea. They also blame lingering effects of the GFC and volatility in capital 
flows.  
However, a middle income trap is too easy an answer. The growth slowdowns shown in 
Table 1 are consistent with at least three other hypotheses: Post-financial crisis slowdown, 
global secular stagnation, and growth convergence.  
A post-financial crisis slowdown is not unique, as Reinhart and Rogoff (2009, 2014) argued. 
According to them, the median length to reach a pre-crisis level is about 6.5 years. In fact, 
“[F]ive to six years after the onset of crisis, only Germany and the United States (out of 12 
systemic cases) have reached their 2007-2008 peaks in real income.” Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2014: p.50). This tendency can explain the Asian slowdown of growth from the pre-AFC to the 
inter-crises period. However, it may not explain the slowdown from the inter-crises period to 
the post-GFC period, since Asia did not suffer from a financial crisis during the GFC. The 
Asian slowdown during the GFC was due to a trade channel from the west to Asia.  
Another possibility for the Asian growth slowdown is that it is a part of global secular 
stagnation. In addition to the growth rate, the inflation rate and the real interest rate have 
been declining since the early 1990s, as Bean, et al (2015) showed. The Asian region may be a 
part of global lack of aggregate demand and savings glut. Any explanations that are consistent 
with secular stagnation are most applicable to advanced countries. Emerging and developing 
Asian countries are unlikely in the state of secular stagnation, that is, the persistent aggregate 
demand being less than aggregate supply.  
The last explanation for the growth slowdown in emerging and developing Asia is the 
theory of growth convergence. The stylized facts of slowing down growth rates can be viewed 




4. Growth Convergence 
Concept of Growth Convergence 
In the growth literature, a phenomenon called “convergence” is theoretically predicted and 
empirically observed. Given common technologies, the higher the income has become, the 
slower the growth rate will become. Put differently, a low-income country can grow faster than 
a high-income country, since marginal contribution to growth of capital accumulation is much 
higher among the low-income countries. As Appendix to this paper shows, the typical 
convergence equation can be written as follows:  
 
gj(t)= a + b{log(yj(t)) – log yj*(t)} 
 
where gj denotes the per-capita income growth rate; a is a steady state growth rate; yj(t) is the 
county j’s per capita income; and yj*(t) is the output at the steady state where the effective 
capital-labor ratio stays constant. The growth convergence implies b < 0. The growth rate can 
be decomposed into the steady-state growth rate, a, and the catch-up factor, the second term. 
The more the current per-capita income level is below the steady state level, the higher the 
growth rate becomes. Thus, country j converges to a steady state. 
The steady-state income level is changing over time, since even at a steady state, the 
growth rate is positive. Once the per-capita income reaches a steady state, y*, then the second 
term becomes zero and the per-capita income increases at the constant rate of a.  
The steady state for country j may not be known in reality, unless the country reaches that 
stage of constant growth. However, among the advanced countries, it is expected that the 
steady state, or the goal of catch-up process, is the level of US income and growth rate. 
Advanced countries should converge to the US (or OECD) level of income. If this holds true, 
we can substitute the US income level at time t, 𝑦𝑦𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈(𝑡𝑡), for yj*(t). 
 
gj(t) = a + b{log yj(t) – log 𝑦𝑦𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈(𝑡𝑡)} 
 
This is the basic regression equation of growth convergence. The growth convergence 
predicts b<0. In empirical research, the convergence hypothesis can be shown as the negative 
correlation between the period-average per-capita GDP growth rate and the level of the per-
capita GDP level at the beginning of the period. The lower-income countries can grow faster 
than the high-income countries. There may be several reasons for this. First, the high 
marginal productivity of capital in low-income countries imply the higher growth rate. This is 
possible even if the production function has the same specification. Second, it is more likely 
that the low-income country has a low technological level that depresses its income level. 
However, it is possible to achieve a higher growth rate because technological transfers and 
learning by doing are possible. For a low-income country, imitation, not innovation, may be 
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enough to increase its total factor productivity. Third, starting from a low level of 
infrastructure and human capital, public spending on these public goods and education can 
easily increase its productivity. In the conditional convergence literature, it is often assumed 
that conditions are fixed at the initial point (the year where the analysis starts), and growth 
is traced for the following decades. 
Of course, not all low-income countries can achieve high growth. There are many countries 
that are stuck in the low-income, low-growth state. Many factors can explain the poverty trap. 
Much of the population may be in a minimum subsistent level so that they have to spend all 
of their time in farming, fishing or hunting, without increasing human capital (education) or 
improving productivity (machines). Hence, poverty reproduces poverty. Under this state, large 
populations were once considered to be a disadvantage, as was in Myrdal (1968). Having 
exportable resources help in theory, but often the corrupt governments skim off most of export 
revenues for personal benefit.  
East Asian countries, typically without large resources, successfully took off from the 
poverty trap one after another. Scholars and policy makers in the East Asian countries tend 
to credit industrial policies for the take-off. The government directed resources and credit to 
industries that have the best chance to become competitive in the global markets. Private 
sector companies compete in productivity and those who succeed in exports were rewarded by 
the government by more resources and financial incentives. The typical East Asian 
government also spent a substantial amount in building their infrastructure (road, electricity, 
rail, ports) networks and nationwide education systems. A positive view of market-friendly 
interventions by benevolent governments was and still is prevalent in the East Asia. The 
Asian Miracle, portrayed by the World Bank (1993), is applicable at least for Japan, the Four 
Tigers, and the ASEAN-5, with some time-lag. 
The typical growth convergence is depicted in Figure 5. Once a take-off from the poverty 
trap is made, often by a big push by the government or by a significant policy reform, the 
economy reaches the growth convergence line and the economy enjoys the virtuous circle of 
higher growth and more investment, through the income increases of the population.  
Figure 5 about here 
Although this view was strongly supported in time-series data of countries in East Asia, 
any casual test or a rigorous extension to other regions—South Asia, Latin America, and 
Africa—tends to fail. Cross-section or panel date analyses involving all countries (where data 
are available) in the world fail to produce the downward-sloping convergence line (see Barro 
(1991) for an early attempt). East Asia was treated as an exception (i.e., miracle) rather than 
as a standard role model.  
A single convergence line in an attempt to explain many countries needs a strong 
assumption that the specification of the production function is identical across countries and 
the only difference is the degree of capital accumulations. In reality, the technological level, 
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whether it is embodied in labor or capital, may be vastly different. Technological progress, 
often measured in Total Factor Productivity, also differs. Capital and labor shares may be 
different too.  
Many factors that are relevant to the production function also matter. The empirical 
literature has identified many factors that can explain the difference in growth. The list 
ranges from historical conditions, geographical conditions, institutions, and accumulated 
human capital. The historical conditions include human capital (Barro (1991) and Mankiw et 
al. (1992)) and “colonial origin” (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002). Demography 
also matters, as shown in Bloom, et al. (2000), since the age composition, given the size of 
population, is important for labor input. Thus, it becomes standard to consider the “conditional 
convergence,” where convergence speed differs among countries. In a sense, convergence paths 
may not be unique, but multiple paths exist. Theoretically, this reflects the difference in the 
level of technology and its growth contribution. See Han and Wei (2005) for an excellent 
overview.  
Foreign direct investment (FDI) played an important role in East Asia, with the 
conspicuous exception of Japan and Korea. FDI brings in both physical capital and technology 
associated with the use of capital. Borensztein, et al. (1998) showed that FDI contributes more 
than domestic investment, presumably due to technological transfers, but that is the case only 
when the host country has a capacity to absorb with accumulated human capital. This should 
fit the story in East Asia since educational attainment in the region is relatively higher.  
 
Stylized Facts of Growth Convergence in Asia 
In the rest of this section, I will search for and show the growth convergence pattern in 
East Asia. I will propose a framework that encompasses notions of the poverty trap, the 
middle-income trap, and convergence to a high-income group.7 The three periods of pre-AFC 
(1985-96); inter-crises (1999-2007); and post-GFC (2010-2015) are used as in previous sections. 
The crisis years are omitted since that would make the average growth rate altered by the two 
unusual crises. In the following, we use the period average per-capita growth rates as the 
vertical axis and the log of per-capital income level (in US dollar converted at the market 
exchange rate) of the first year of each period as the horizontal axis. The sample countries are 
Japan, the Four Tigers, ASEAN-5, the four low-income ASEAN countries (CLMV), China, and 
India. The period-average growth rates are shown in Table 1.  
Table 1 about here 
For the growth convergence figures, the growth rate is taken as a vertical axis, and the 
income level is taken as a horizontal axis. The convergence hypothesis implies that plots of 
different periods of a particular country move along the line from the northwest to the 
                                                   
7 The term middle income trap was first proposed by Gill and Kharas (2007).  
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southeast. If several countries can be plotted on the same line, then those countries are 
expected to converge in the same growth model (technology) toward a high-income, low-growth 
steady state (goal of development).  
As a first attempt, Figure 6 shows plots of all the East Asian countries (and India) in one 
graph. The connected dots of each country is mostly downward sloping, suggesting that growth 
convergence is evident in the time-series of each country. Some low-income countries show an 
upward-sloping line. These upward movements – accelerations of growth as the income level 
rises – may still be part of a “take-off” from a poverty trap with the dysfunctional government 
via strong reforms.  
Figure 6 about here 
However, Figure 6 is not appropriate when the global leader, the United States, is also 
moving toward the right in the convergence graph. To be precise, growth convergence should 
be interpreted as a convergence to the US level of income level and the US steady state growth 
rate, say 2 percent. This will be explained in a rigorous manner in the following subsections.  
In order to take this into account, the horizontal axis is modified to be the difference of the 
country’s per-capita income to the log of the difference of the country’s per-capita income from 
the US per-capita income. The zero in the horizontal axis implies reaching the US per-capita 
income level. Figure 7 shows the relative convergence to the US, using the log difference to 
the US for the horizontal axis. It shows the general tendency of growth convergence for each 
country, but as a panel data, no single convergence path can be drawn. 
Figure 7 about here 
 
Multiple Convergence Paths 
With careful observations of Figure 7, it seems that some countries can be grouped together 
to share a common convergence path. In fact, three groups can be found to experience similar 
growth patterns. Group 1 is the high-income group including Japan and the Four Tigers. 
Group 2 is the middle-income group including China, Thailand and Malaysia, and possibly 
Indonesia and the post-GFC Philippines. Group 3 is the low income group including CLMV, 
India and possibly the pre-AFC and inter-crises Philippines.  
It is rather obvious that Japan and Four Tigers belongs to the same group, as dots of these 
countries line up on the straight convergence line with little deviation. China seems to be 
moving from the low-income group to the middle-income group, and now approaching the high-
income group.  
Both Indonesia and the Philippines are on the border area of Group 2 and Group 3 with 
atypical time-series behavior, namely they are not downward sloping. Indonesia in the inter-
crises period has a lower growth rate AND lower per-capita income than the period before or 
after. This is because Indonesia suffered from long-lasting damage from AFC with large 
income decline and depreciation of the Rupiah. The inter-crises Indonesia is close to the low-
12 
 
income group, while Indonesia in the pre-AFC and post-GFC periods may belong in the 
middle-income group.  
The Philippine time-series shows an upward movement. Growth accelerated as the income 
level rose. This is opposite of what the growth convergence predicts. This unusual behavior 
may be due to continuous improvement in socio-economic and political conditions for the last 
thirty years. The improved investment climate is generally attributed to improved governance 
and especially greater political stability after the AFC and in particular after the GFC.  
Hence, we will examine the following cases: 
 
Case 1. Indonesia is in the middle-income group and the Philippines is in the low-income 
group;  
Case 2. Both Indonesia and the Philippines are in the low-income group.  
Case 3. Indonesia in the inter-crises period is in the low-income group but the other two 
periods in the middle-income group; and the Philippines in the pre-AFC and the inter-crises 
period is in the low-income group and during the post-AFC in the middle-income group.  
 
For each case, the regression analysis is conducted to find the convergence line with the 
following specification which is consistent with theory:  
 
gj(t) = a + b{log yj(t) – log 𝑦𝑦𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈(𝑡𝑡)} 
 
where t = 1 (pre-AFC), 2 (inter-crises), 3 (post-GFC); j denotes a country; and b < 0 is expected. 
The cross-section, time-series pooled regression is conducted. Then the growth convergence 
line for each group of countries is found by estimates of a and b.   
 
Table 2 shows the regression results for all three cases (regarding grouping of Indonesia 
and the Philippines). Using the estimated values of a and b, growth convergence lines can be 
superimposed on Figure 7.  
Table 2 about here 
Figure 8 shows the fitted lines of the regressions for case 1. The convergence line for Group 
1 seems to have only small deviations (errors). However both Group 2 and Group 3 have wide 
variations around them.  
Figure 8 about here 
Similarly, Figures 9 and 10 show growth convergence lines of Case 2 and Case 3, 
respectively. Since we are agnostic as to whether Indonesia and the Philippines should be 
included in the middle-income group, these three cases are presented. They serve as a test of 
robustness regarding the grouping of countries.  
Figures 9 and 10 about here 
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All three figures show downward sloping convergence lines. Convergence lines are almost 
parallel in Case 3. In all cases, the middle-income convergence hits the steady state growth 
rate, g, say 0.02 (2%), but it does not reach the level of the high-income steady state. Hence, it 
is not the matter of fast- or slow-convergence to the common high-income stated, but the 
middle-income trap does exist. Countries on the middle-income convergence line have to make 
a jump to the high-income convergence line, sooner or later.  
The three convergence lines suggest that if a country fails to jump from one convergence 
path to a higher one, the country will end up in the state where the gap to the US income level 
will not be narrowed.  
 
Conditional Convergence with Jumps 
Figure 11 explains in a schematic way how jumps are required to avoid a trap: one from a 
low-income convergence path to a middle-income one, and another jump from a middle-income 
convergence path to a higher-income one.  
Figure 11 about here 
A group of countries belongs to the same convergence line. For example, Japan and the 
Four Tigers belong to one convergence line, while middle income ASEAN countries share one 
convergence path. The low-income ASEAN countries also have a common convergence path. 
This means that countries that belong to the same convergence path share similar 
technologies. The difference is the degree of capital accumulation. 
China maintains a relatively high growth rate, although the per-capita income level is 
approaching the top of the middle-income range. Although the Chinese growth rate is 
declining slightly, it seems possible for them to avoid a middle-income trap.  
 
Middle-Income Trap in the context of Growth Convergence 
With the framework proposed above, a middle-income trap is easily understood as a result 
of failing to make a jump from a middle-income convergence path to a high-income 
convergence path. Growth convergence comes at a steady state that is lower than the steady 
state of the advanced countries, say at the US level. When the country’s growth rate becomes 
equal with the US long-run per-capita growth rate, the gap between the US and the country 
in per-capita income (position on the horizontal axis) stays constant. When a country follows 
the middle-income convergence path to a steady state, the income gap remains permanently. 
This country is said to be stuck in a middle income trap. In fact, it is not a trap, but a failure 
to adopt innovations in technological progress. In the examination above, Thailand is 
approaching close to 2% per-capita growth and it may fail to catch up to the US level of per-
capita income, unless Thailand makes a regime shift toward innovation.  
Aiyar, et al. (2013) had an investigation very similar to this study, comparing the time-
series of Asian and Latin American emerging market economies. They define a middle income 
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trap as a sudden deceleration in growth. By probit regressions, they argue that “(i) middle-
income countries are, in fact, disproportionately likely to experience growth slowdowns, and 
(ii) this result is robust to a wide range of income thresholds for defining ‘middle income.’” 
(Aiyar, 2013. P. 12) Then, they go on to examine factors that cause sudden growth slowdowns. 
The difference between our approach and the Aiyar, et al. approach is that it is assumed here 
that there exist multiple growth convergence lines, so that it could be a gradual slowdown 
that ends up in a middle-income steady state, in contrast to their idea that a middle income 
county can fall off from the growth convergence line. Felipe, et al. (2014) examined countries’ 
transitions across income groups, similar to this paper. They searched for evidence that 
supports the middle-income trap, i.e., a country is stuck in middle-income status. They refuted 
this proposition in favor of a hypothesis that there is a slow transition vs. a fast transition 
from middle to high income. Im and Rosenblatt (2013) examined transition phases in the 
cross-country distribution of income. Their transition matrix analysis provides little support 
for the idea of a middle-income trap. Han and Wei (2015) also examined a transition matrix 
analysis and rejected an unconditional middle-income trap. They argued that there are factors 
such as working age population, financial development, and macroeconomic stability that 
affect the choice between fast- and slow-growing countries.  
Eichengreen, et al. (2012, 2013) argue that there are certain income levels in which a 
sudden slowdown tends to occur. In their 2013 paper, they argued that the reflection levels 
are $10,000-$11,000 and $15,000-$16,000 (in 2005 purchasing power parity dollars). It is not 
clear whether they argue that a slowdown is a natural process of middle-income growth 
convergence, or falling off from the high-income growth convergence. However, their 
conclusion is that “slowdowns are less likely in countries where the population has a relatively 
high level of secondary and tertiary education and where high-technology products account 
for a relatively large share of exports.” This is a mirror to our argument that one needs 
innovation to jump from the middle-income convergence path to a high-income convergence 
path.  
Bullman, et al. (2014) argue that determinants of growth at the low-income level are 
different from those at the high-income level. Their model implies that a transition from low- 
to high-income status can be smooth, if a country redirects its resources to factors that are 
important for high-income growth. The implication is that a middle income trap does not exist.  
Robertson and Ye (2013), in contrast to the above papers, confirmed the existence of a 
middle-income trap. This is defined as when the per-capita income will not rise beyond the 
middle income range in the indefinite future. This can be investigated by the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test. The result is not immediately conclusive because ADF 
requires a large sample, while the sample size in growth convergence or middle-income trap 
is limited.  
This paper defined the middle-income trap in the context of growth convergence. Providing 
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an interpretation of the middle-income trap in the growth convergence is novel. Empirical 
investigations using panel data are also new. Results are more in the form of suggestive 
evidence than a hypothesis testing due to the limited sample size. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
This paper examined the growth experiences of Asian countries in the framework of 
conditional convergence. With a proper grouping of countries, three convergence paths are 
found. The estimations show that each of the Asian countries are following one of the three 
convergence paths. The middle-income trap can be viewed as a middle-income country that 
fails to make a jump and converge to a middle-income steady state.   
It requires strong reforms or political regime shift to stimulate enough innovation 
(technological progress) to jump from a middle-income convergence path to a high-income 
convergence path. Finding three convergence paths is reasonable. To put the debate of middle-
income trap in the framework of growth convergence is novel in this paper. 
Admittedly, empirical results are subject to further examination. Extending the analysis to 
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Appendix: Growth Convergence 
 
The following derivation of the convergence regression is straight out of Acemoglu (2009: 
Chapters 2 and 3) with a few modification in notations and an additional complexity with 
heterogeneous countries.  
 
Consider a labor-augmenting Slow-type growth model with a constant saving rate, s; a 
constant depreciation rate z: 
Y(t) = 𝐹𝐹(𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡),𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡)𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)) (1) 
where Y is output; F is a production function of homogeneous of degree one; K is capital; A is 






















Then, using this definition of y(t) and (2) becomes 
y(t) = 𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡)𝑓𝑓(𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡)) (3) 
A change in K(t), dK(t), is a new accumulation of capital by investment, which is assumed to 
be equal to saving, minus depreciation.  
dK(t) = 𝑠𝑠𝑌𝑌(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑧𝑧𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡)  
where d is the notation of time derivative (assuming a continuous time model). The growth 













where time notation (t) is omitted. Assume a constant rate of technological progress, a, and a 






− 𝑎𝑎 − 𝑛𝑛 (5) 










− (𝑧𝑧 + 𝑎𝑎 + 𝑛𝑛) 
 






− (𝑧𝑧 + 𝑎𝑎 + 𝑛𝑛) (6) 
Or equivalently,  
dk(t) = 𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓(𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡)) − (𝑧𝑧 + 𝑎𝑎 + 𝑛𝑛)𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡) (7) 
When the production function F satisfies certain conditions (Assumptions 1 and 2 Acemoglu 
(2009; p.29 and p.33, respectively)), there exists a unique, globally stable steady state k*>0, 
where  
𝑘𝑘∗ is 𝑘𝑘  such that 𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓(𝑘𝑘∗)− (𝑧𝑧 + 𝑎𝑎 + 𝑛𝑛)𝑘𝑘∗ = 0  
The steady state per-capita income is denoted as y* and y*(t)=A(t)f(k*). At the steady state, 
Y/L and K/L increases at the rate of a, the technological progress. So, ultimately, the economy 
will converge to a state where the growth rate equals the technological progress rate. It is easy 
to show in comparative statics exercises that k* is an increasing function of s and A(0), i.e., 
the initial level of technology, and decreasing function of n and z. How to find k* from (7) and 
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a set of parameters are depicted in Figure A-1.  
Figure A-1 about here 
 
Recall (3) and differentiate with respect to time, then the growth rate g of per-capita income 
























Where ε(k)≡f ’(k(t)) k(t)/f(k(t)) is the elasticity of the production function. Note that 0 <ε(k) 
< 1, and {dk(t)/k(t)} was shown in (6).   
Acemoglu (2009, pp. 80-81) describes the process of taking the first-order Taylor expansion of 
(6) with respect to log k(t)and substituting it into (8). Then it would become the following 








≈ 𝑎𝑎 − �1 − 𝜀𝜀(𝑘𝑘∗)�(𝑧𝑧 + 𝑎𝑎 + 𝑛𝑛)(log𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡) − log𝑘𝑘∗) (9) 
The first term is the steady state growth rate, which is the technological progress rate. The 
second term is the convergence term. If y<y*, then g>a, and vice versa. This shows that the 
growth rate is a decreasing function of y, thus the downward sloping convergence line. This is 
depicted as the solid line in Figure A-2.  
 
The following is an application of the above summary of theory of convergence a la Acemoglu 
(2009), which is needed to derive multiple convergence lines. Suppose that at some point of 
time t=t0, there was jump in technology from A(t0) to A+(t0), other parameters being equal, 
where  
A(𝑡𝑡0) < A+(𝑡𝑡0)  
Then, k* and y*will become larger and the convergence line shifts to right as depicted in the 
broken line in Figure A-2. As k(t) is defined as K(t)/A(t)L(t), a sudden jump in the value of A 
will lower the k(t0).However, y(t0) = A(t0) f(k(t0)) will become higher. The economy will jump 
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from (y(t0), g(t0)) to (y+(t0), g+(t0)) to y+(t0), and the growth rate will become higher due to the 
convergence term. These lines corresponds to multiple convergence lines in the text.  
Figure A-2 about here 


































Pre-AFC Inter crises Post-GFC
1985-96 1999-2007 2010-2015
Hong Kong 4.8% 4.7% 2.2%
Japan 2.8% 1.4% 0.9%
Korea 8.2% 4.8% 2.5%
Singapore 5.7% 4.4% 2.1%
Taiwan 7.1% 4.3% 2.5%
Malaysia 5.5% 3.3% 3.5%
Indonesia 5.9% 3.6% 4.0%
Thailand 7.6% 4.4% 2.4%
Philippines 1.3% 3.0% 4.0%
Cambodia NA 7.7% 5.5%
Lao P.D.R. 2.2% 5.1% 5.8%
Myanmar NA 12.1% 6.8%
Vietnam 4.8% 5.9% 4.8%
China 8.6% 9.8% 7.3%
India 3.6% 5.4% 5.0%
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α β α β α β Case1:
Coefficient 0.016 -0.031 Coefficient 0.016 -0.031 Coefficient 0.016 -0.031 Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan
STD Er 0.005 0.005 STD Er 0.005 0.005 STD Er 0.005 0.005 Case2:
t- stat 3.298 -6.172 t- stat 3.298 -6.172 t- stat 3.298 -6.172 Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan
p stat 0.006 0.000 p stat 0.006 0.000 p stat 0.006 0.000 Case3:
R-bar sq R-bar sq R-bar sq Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan
# obs # obs # obs
α β α β α β Case1:
Coefficient 0.001 -0.019 Coefficient -0.013 -0.026 Coefficient -0.011 -0.024 China, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand
STD Er 0.023 0.008 STD Er 0.021 0.007 STD Er 0.021 0.007 Case2:
t- stat 0.050 -2.359 t- stat -0.629 -3.517 t- stat -0.518 -3.212 China, Malaysia and Thailand
p stat 0.961 0.040 p stat 0.549 0.010 p stat 0.616 0.009 Case3:
R-bar sq R-bar sq R-bar sq
# obs # obs # obs
α β α β α β Case1:
Coefficient -0.071 -0.031 Coefficient -0.042 -0.024 Coefficient -0.089 -0.035 Cambodia, India, Lao Republic, Myanmar, Philippines, Vietnam
STD Er 0.031 0.008 STD Er 0.027 0.007 STD Er 0.033 0.008 Case2:
t- stat -2.282 -3.973 t- stat -1.584 -3.537 t- stat -2.711 -4.309
p stat 0.039 0.001 p stat 0.132 0.003 p stat 0.017 0.001
R-bar sq R-bar sq R-bar sq Case3:
# obs # obs # obs
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
Cambodia, India, Indonesia (t=2), Lao Republic, Myanmar,
Philippines (t=1,2), Vietnam
China, Malaysia and Thailand, Indonesia (t=1,3), Philippines
(t=3)

































































jump from A(t0) to A+(t0)
g
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y0* y*＋y(t0) y+(t0)
